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Abstract 
This paper examines the politicization of the United Nations Security Council (SC) 
and seeks to explore the causes and effects of this process. I will first demonstrate that 
the SC has expanded both its scope and authority after the end of the Cold War. With 
the SC becoming more powerful I then consider whether the Council has become the 
target of politicization and has met with criticism and resistance. I find that there is an 
on-going, observable process of politicization although the SC is significantly less 
contested than a number of other international organizations. Regarding the possible 
effects of politicization, the paper examines whether and to what extent the Security 
Council has adapted its institutional design. I find that the Council has—hesitantly—
opened up to civil society actors, although interaction with NGOs is limited to an 
informal consultation process coupled with broad discretionary power of the SC’s 
Permanent Members. In the concluding part of the paper I briefly examine how this 
outcome might be best explained and offer some hypotheses for further research. 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Politisierung internationaler Sicherheitsinstitutionen: 
Der UN-Sicherheitsrat und NGOs 
Das vorliegende Papier untersucht die Politisierung des UN-Sicherheitsrats und 
beleuchtet Bedingungsfaktoren und Effekte dieses Prozesses. Dazu wird zunächst 
gezeigt, dass der Sicherheitsrat nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges deutlich an 
Bedeutung gewonnen hat und nicht nur seinen Kompetenzbereich ausgeweitet hat, 
sondern auch zunehmend tief in nationale Gesellschaften hineinregiert. Anschließend 
wird beleuchtet, ob der Sicherheitsrat im Zuge dieses Machtzuwachses zur Zielscheibe 
von Kritik und Widerstand wurde. Es zeigt sich, dass sich ein Prozess der Politisierung 
feststellen lässt, der gleichwohl deutlich unter Schwelle von Protesten bleibt wie sie 
von anderen internationalen Organisationen bekannt sind. Hinsichtlich möglicher 
Effekte von Politisierung wird gefragt, ob das Gremium sein institutionelles Design 
angepasst und sich für zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure geöffnet hat. Es wird deutlich, 
dass sich der Sicherheitsrat zwar in der Tat zunehmend für NGOs öffnet, dass diese 
Öffnung aber auf informelle Konsultationen beschränkt bleibt, deren Zustande-
kommen zudem stark dem Willen der Ständigen Mitglieder unterworfen ist. Der letzte 
Teil des Papier fragt schließlich, wie ein solcher Prozess der partiellen Öffnung erklärt 
werden kann und formuliert einige Hypothesen für künftige Forschung. 
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0. Introduction 
This paper examines the politicization of international security institutions, using as an 
example the United Nations Security Council, and focuses on possible causes and 
effects of this process. To examine the politicization of the United Nations Security 
Council might first appear somewhat odd: one can hardly imagine any international 
institution being more “political” or “politicized” than the Security Council. In this 
paper, however, politicization does not mean that political interests strongly influence 
Security Council decisions—they certainly do—but that issues that relate to the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council and its decisions are removed from the 
back room of “executive multilateralism” and brought into the political sphere where 
they are publicly debated. Politicization is conceptualized broadly—it might range 
from public criticism to open resistance and might be propelled by civil society actors 
as well as by states. 
What are the causes of politicization? One key factor that is stressed in the schol-
arly literature is power. Wherever power is wielded, it is argued, criticism and resis-
tance will occur (Dillon 2003: 21; Maiguashca 2003: 22; Barnett/Duvall 2005: 22). A 
number of authors observe that power is increasingly exerted by international organi-
zations that have expanded in both scope and authority over the past decades 
(Grant/Keohane 2005; Barnett/Finnemore 2005). Therefore, the increase in power of 
international organizations can be plausibly assumed to be a cause of their politiciza-
tion (Zürn et al 2007). 
Regarding the possible effects of politicization, it has been observed that interna-
tional organizations respond to criticism and resistance by adapting their respective 
institutional designs and procedures—they open up for non-state actors. This opening 
up of international institutions has attracted much academic attention and has been 
described as a fundamental trend in global governance (Gordenker and Weiss 1996; 
Alger 2002; Tallberg 2008).1 Some scholars argue that the inclusion of non-state 
actors might be a way to mitigate the democratic deficit in global governance (Scholte 
2004; Clark 2003; Zürn 2004; Grant/Keohane 2005; Held/Archibugi 2005). Apart 
                                                 
1 Note that interactions between international organizations and NGOs are hardly new but date 
back to the end of the 19th century (Alger 2002). 
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from such normative contributions, empirical research projects systematically address 
the question of whether and to what extent international organizations have granted 
access to non-state actors (Steffek et al. 2008). Finally, a number of studies seek to 
provide explanations why access is granted to NGOs and why international organiza-
tions open up to non-state actors in varying degrees (Raustiala 1997; Nölke 2000; 
Brühl 2003; Steffek 2008; Tallberg 2008; Liese 2008).  
While research on interactions between international organizations and NGOs is 
much en vogue, two limitations can be observed. First, little attention is paid to inter-
national security institutions (the exception is Mayer 2008). In particular, the UN 
Security Council as the “most powerful international institution in the history of the 
nation state” (Cronin and Hurd 2008) is widely neglected. Second, the role of politici-
zation as a further plausible independent variable for the opening up of international 
institutions to NGOs has largely been ignored so far. The aim of this paper is to 
address these issues. 
To this end, I will examine the thesis of politicization for the UN Security Coun-
cil. The Security Council is expected to be an “easy case” for politicization and, at the 
same time, as a “hard case” for the opening up to civil society actors. If this thesis is 
correct, then we should to observe dynamics of contestation for the Security Council. 
This is for two reasons. First, after the Cold War, the Council not only intensified its 
activities, it also expanded its authority significantly, beyond the traditional notion of 
threats to security, to include “human security” issues, state failure, and international 
terrorism. As a result, to tackle such behind-the-boarder issues, the Council often uses 
coercive measures and penetrates into national societies. Second, while the importance 
of the Security Council has increased, its institutional design and its decision making 
procedures have remained exclusive, opaque, and selective; therefore we should 
expect a high degree of politicization where this organization is concerned. On the 
other hand, the field of international security is a field of “high politics.” As such it is 
highly sensitive, and it is unlikely that the members of the Security Council would 
want to share vital information with non-state actors. Therefore, we should expect the 
Permanent Members of the Council to be extremely reluctant to grant any form of 
institutional access to civil society actors. 
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This paper has three parts. The first part briefly illustrates to what extent the Secu-
rity Council expanded in both scope and authority after the Cold War. I will show that 
there has been a quantitative and qualitative shift in SC activity associated with the 
transformation of security threats and the change in international norms. In the second 
part of the paper, against the backdrop of increased importance of the SC, I consider 
whether the Council has met with criticism and resistance. I find that there is an on-
going, observable process of politicization, but this has, of course, remained well 
below the international contestation of the type associated with Seattle in 1999 or 
Genoa in 2001. The third part of the paper addresses the issue of whether and to what 
extent the Security Council has adapted its institutional design and granted access to 
non-state actors. Here, against all expectations, I find that the Council has—albeit 
hesitantly—opened up to NGO interaction. NGO access, however, is limited to 
informal consultation coupled with broad discretionary power of the Permanent 
Members. In the concluding part of the paper, I briefly examine how this outcome 
might be best explained and offer some hypotheses for further research. 
1. The UN Security Council after the Cold War 
The scope and authority of the Security Council undoubtedly expanded after the Cold 
War (Malone 2004b; Luck 2006; Cronin and Hurd 2008). The end of the East-West 
confrontation profoundly altered the opportunity structures of international politics 
and made possible the reactivation of the UN Security Council. For decades the 
Security Council has been unable to assume its primary responsibility, namely, the 
maintenance of international peace and security (Art. 24 of the United Nations Char-
ter). This stalemate, however, ended in 1990, turning the de jure power of Council into 
de facto power. Not only did the numbers of vetoes decline sharply from 192 before 
1990 to 12 after the Cold War, today the Council also meets on an almost daily basis 
(Malone 2004a: 7). Moreover, the Security Council has significantly increased its 
activity, as is most prominently reflected by the authorization of a growing number of 
UN peacekeeping operations (Bellamy and Williams 2005; Human Security Report 
2005). 
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Not only have the Security Council’s activities intensified, they have also changed 
qualitatively. For one thing, the Security Council expanded the scope of what (accord-
ing to article 39 of the UN Charter) constitutes a “threat to international peace and 
security” beyond interstate wars to include civil wars, humanitarian crises, state 
failure, international terrorism, human rights violations, and coups against democrati-
cally elected regimes (Chesterman 2001: 112-162; Wallensteen and Johannsson 2004: 
29). Moreover, the Council adopted a number of resolutions on broader thematic 
issues beyond particular conflicts, including, for instance, the role of women in the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts (Resolution 1325), children and armed conflicts 
(Resolution 1460), child soldiers (Resolution 1261), the HIV/AIDS problematique 
(Resolution 1308) and on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and 
mercenary activities (Resolution 1467) In April 2007 the UNSC, for the first time, also 
discussed the implications of climate change (SC/9000). 
Likewise, with the expansion of article 39 of the UN Charter, the SC has also in-
creasingly undertaken coercive measures against the will of affected states or parties to 
a conflict. The number of Chapter VII resolutions grew from 24 before 1990 to 166 in 
1999 (Chesterman 2001, annex 1). Further, UN peacekeeping operations have been 
increasingly mandated as “robust” peacekeeping under Chapter VII. In the same vein, 
after the Cold War the number of UN sanctions rose to 14 after 1990, compared to 
only two prior to that time. Under Chapter VII, the SC also authorized a number of 
military humanitarian interventions, including those in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, 
and Bosnia. Finally, a number of international or internationalized criminal courts 
(Romano et al. 2004) as well as transitional administrations (Chesterman 2004; Paris 
2004) were established. 
Because of the extension of its scope and authority, the Security Council has been 
characterized as “world legislator”. For instance, like the case of Resolution 1373 and 
the fight against terrorism, non-mandatory international agreements or agreements still 
in the process of negotiation, can be made legally binding for all states if adopted 
under Chapter VII of the UN charter. As a result, the UNSC seems to be at the center 
of an emerging international legal order that is more centralized and less consensual 
than it has been in the past (von Schorlemer 2004: 79-80). 
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The increased authority and range of activities of the Security Council has been be 
ascribed first to the transformation of security threats (Wallensteen and Johannson 
2004: 21-23)2. In contrast to inter-state wars, these “new” security threats—e.g., civil 
wars, humanitarian crises, terrorism, and state failure—are behind-the-border issues. 
Although they usually originate within national societies, they have transnational 
implications (Kahler 1995). As a result, the SC action does not halt at national borders. 
To address these new kinds of security threats, coercive measures penetrating national 
societies have been taken against the will of the states or parties to a conflict (Zangl 
and Zürn 2003). 
Second, this trend towards expansion of power by the SC is considered to reflect a 
change in international norms and the strengthening of an “humanitarian imperative” 
in the Council’s action (Luck 2006: 81-92). The universalization of human rights and 
the rise of “humanitarian” norms, over the past thirty years, have meant that today 
these principles frequently supersede the traditional rules of non-intervention and non-
use of force (Wheeler 2000, Sandholtz 2002, Finnemore 2003). Apart from the secu-
rity of sovereign states “human security” has become a major issue on the interna-
tional security agenda. Sovereignty is now understood as a state’s responsibility 
towards its citizens; it is bound to certain conditions. According to the principle of 
“responsibility to protect,” approved by all of the countries at the UN World Summit 
in 2005, sovereign rights may be forfeited “where a population is suffering serious 
harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure and the state in 
question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it” (ICISS 2001: XI). 
The fact that security rights have been extended to individuals and groups has ma-
jor implications for international security policy. First, it is more likely that the Secu-
rity Council will take coercive measures to end the violations of these rights. Second, 
human security rights create a need for verification that must be largely provided by 
international NGOs. This, in turn, promotes the transnationalization of international 
security. Third, human rights and humanitarian norms of course did not replace, but 
merely supplemented, the basic principle of state sovereignty. As a result, in the field 
of international security, there are conflicting sets of norms that require arbitration 
                                                 
2 For the transformation of the international conflict agenda see Jackson (1990), Zartmann (1995), 
and Kaldor (2001). 
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where they collide. This function of “adjudication” has been taken over by the Secu-
rity Council. 
In sum, the UN Security Council, as the most powerful existing international insti-
tution, has expanded both the extent of its activities and the scope of its authority since 
the Cold War. In many cases the SC has turned to “supranational coercion” to tackle 
behind-the-border issues (civil conflicts, humanitarian crises, terrorism, etc.). This 
development can be ascribed to a transformation of security threats, a change in 
international norms and a change in the opportunity structures of world politics 
following the Cold War. 
2. The politicization of the Security Council? 
As the relevance of the UN Security Council increased, can we also observe a parallel 
process of politicization? Were state and non-state actors perceptive to the qualitative 
and quantitative shift in the activities of the Security Council? Has there been any 
public contestation vis-à-vis the SC’s new powers, or have there been any new norma-
tively motivated demands directed towards the Council and its policies? If the thesis of 
politicization is correct, then we should witness not only criticism and resistance to 
multilateral economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the 
World Bank, but also and especially to the Security Council. More specifically, the SC 
should be contested because its institutional design and its decision-making procedures 
violate almost all of the criteria identified for “legitimate global governance,” includ-
ing inclusiveness, transparency, accountability, and consistency (Zürn et al. 2007: 154-
156).3 
First, the perpetuation of the status quo at the end of the Second World War and 
the resulting veto rights of the victorious powers violate demands for representative-
ness.4 Due to the exclusive veto rights of the Permanent Members (P-5) of the Security 
Council, that organization is considered to be a prime example of “institutionalized 
inequality” (Zürn 2007; Preuß 2008). Not only are there no Permanent Members from 
Africa or South America, the states affected most by Security Council decisions are 
                                                 
3 For a detailed account of the SC’s legitimacy problems see, for instance, Knight (2002). 
4 In 1965, due to the growth in UN member states, the number of non-permanent members in-
creased from six to ten. 
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almost always excluded from the decision-making process. Second, the decision-
making procedures of the Council are highly opaque and largely insulated from public 
scrutiny. This situation has not changed since the end of the Cold War. To the con-
trary, “after 1990 the Council’s deliberations had become more secretive and unac-
countable than ever, with meetings largely held behind closed doors in private ‘consul-
tations of the whole’” (Paul 2004: 375; Malone 2004a: 7). Finally, the Council’s 
decisions have been highly selective. In response to some conflicts or humanitarian 
crises (such as those in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, or East Timor), strong 
action, including the use of force, has been taken; in other similar cases (for example, 
Angola, Zaire, Chechnya, Kurdistan or, until recently, Darfur), however, nothing of 
this sort happened (Kühne 2000, Boulden 2006, Binder 2007). 
Despite the Security Council’s increase in power and the shortcomings in its insti-
tutional design and decision-making procedures, a high level of contestation has not 
yet occurred; unlike the World Treaty Organization (WTO), the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Union or the G-8 Summits, the 
Security Council has thus far met with no mass protests. Nevertheless, below that 
threshold, some forms of politicization can be observed. First, civil society actors have 
become aware of the increased role of SC and its expansion into the area of ‘human 
security’ issues; accordingly these civil society actors seek to gain some leverage 
against SC policy. Second, beginning in 1990s, pressure on the SC to initiate reform 
has gained momentum. Third, the politics of selectivity have become a matter of 
public indignation. Finally civil society actors initiated a number of campaigns in the 
field of international security to raise awareness for issues not addressed by the 
Council. 
The fact that the SC has widened its radius of action and increasingly addresses 
issues beyond “traditional” inter-state security threats has not gone unnoticed by civil 
society actors. This holds in particular for NGOs in the fields of human rights protec-
tion and humanitarian assistance. According to Paul (2004: 374) “[a]s the Council 
took unprecedented action in the area of sanctions, peacekeeping, election monitoring, 
policing and post-conflict peace building, NGOs with international policy mandates 
decided that they must follow the Council’s work more closely.” As a result, at the 
beginning of the 1990s, a number of NGOs including Amnesty International, Earth 
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Action, the Global Policy Forum, the Lawyers’ Committee for Nuclear Policy, the 
World Council of Churches, the International Women’s Tribune Center, and the 
World Federalist Movement formed the “NGO Working Group on the Security 
Council.” The aim of this working group, whose current membership comprises about 
30 NGOs, is to gain leverage over Security Council decisions.5 
Likewise, with the increased power of the SC, the pressure on it to reform also in-
creased, and a number of reform initiatives were initiated.6 It was not just NGOs who 
were forthcoming with such demands; many of the reform initiatives stemmed from 
within the UN system itself. In December 1993, the UN General Assembly decided to 
establish the “Open-Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform.” In October 
1995, in a declaration on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN, the 
members states confirmed that “[t]he Security Council should, inter alia, be expanded 
and its working methods continued to be reviewed in a way that will further strengthen 
its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character and improve its 
working efficiency and transparency” (cited in Fassbender 2004: 344). The UN 
Millenium Declaration of September 2000 contains a similar appeal. More elaborate 
models of reform were presented in the report by the “High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change” and were subsequently taken up in a later report, “In Larger 
Freedom,” by the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan.  
“[A] change in the Council’s composition is needed to make it more broadly representa-
tive of the international community as a whole, as well as of the geopolitical realities of 
today, and thereby more legitimate in the eyes of the world. Its working methods also 
need to be made more efficient and transparent. The Council must be not only more rep-
resentative but also more able and willing to take action when action is needed” (Annan 
2005: 168). 
Finally, the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005 also stipulates the importance 
of Security Council reforms. To be sure, the pressure to adapt its institutional design 
not only stems from civil society actors, but also from UN member states who would 
                                                 
5 See <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/index.htm>, accessed 4 November 2008. 
6 On Security Council reform, see, for example, Fassbender (2004); Weiss and Young (2005). 
Martin Binder y The Politicization of International Institutions? 9
 
 
have a primary interest in gaining influence on the Council. Interestingly, however, 
UN member states’ demands for reform are generally couched in terms of legitimacy.7 
Besides the composition of the SC and the nature of its decision-making proce-
dures its politics of selectivity became a matter of public contention, too. This is what 
Lothar Brock (2007: 168) calls the “outrage of selective interventionism.” Indeed, 
referring to selectivity and the existence of “double standards,” intellectuals, academ-
ics, or members of NGOs have been systematically criticizing the Council’s policy. 
Likewise, adversaries of humanitarian intervention point to selective interventionism 
as a proof of the non-humanitarian motives behind these interventions (see, for exam-
ple, Chomsky 1999). Former UN Secretary Generals also condemned the SC for its 
policy of selectivity. Boutros Boutros Ghali accused the Council of waging a “rich 
man’s war in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger to save Somalia from disintegra-
tion” (cited in Hirsch and Oakley 1995: 37). His successor, Kofi Annan, with respect 
to the intervention in Kosovo noted: “If the new commitment to intervention in the 
face of extreme suffering is to retain the support of the world’s peoples, it must be—
and must be seen to be—fairly and consistently applied, irrespective of region or 
nation. Humanity, after all, is indivisible” (cited in Damrosch 2000: 106). 
Apart from addressing demands to the Security Council for adopting different 
policies and institutional reform, NGOs have also initiated a number of campaigns to 
direct attention to issues which, from an NGO perspective, were not appropriately 
addressed by Security Council. This indicates that it is not only the power of interna-
tional institutions, but also the lack of regulation through international organizations 
that could lead to politicization. 
One of the best-known examples of such campaign work was the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which included about a thousand NGOs from 
more than sixty countries (Cameron 2002). The success of the Ottawa Treaty, which 
prohibits the production and use of antipersonnel landmines, has often been associated 
with the vigorous campaigning of transnational civil society (Price 1998, Cameron 
                                                 
7 For an example of such an apparently non-self-serving state initiative see Draft Resolution on 
Improving the Working Methods of the Security Council of Switzerland, Costa Rica, Singapore, Jordan 
and Liechtenstein of April 2006, <http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/int 
org/un/missny/ga61.Par.0032.File.tmp/sp_060420_securityref_ef.pdf>, accessed 4 November 2008, and 
<http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intorg/un/missny/ga61.Par.0033.File.t
mp/lt_010607_improve_en.pdf>, accessed 4 November 2008. 
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2002). NGOs not only put the issue of landmines on the international agenda,8 they 
also contributed to the outcome of the treaty negotiations through their expertise and 
access to national delegations.9  
NGOs also successfully campaigned for the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). From the mid-1990s on, NGOs played an important role in 
setting the international agenda for such a court, most notably through the work of the 
Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) (Glasius 2002). Perhaps more 
importantly, however, NGOs were also involved in the concrete drafting process of the 
Rome Conference, establishing a statute for the ICC in 1998. Not only did they take 
part in the work of the Preparatory Committee for the conference (Barrow 2004), 
global civil society was also represented at the Rome conference itself with members 
from 236 organizations (Glasius 2002).10  
A final, and still ongoing, campaign is the small-arms campaign, spearheaded by 
the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), which comprises more 
than 800 organizations.11 While NGO advocacy played an important role in placing 
small arms on the international agenda during the mid- and late-1990s (Batchelor 
2002), NGO participation in various UN Conferences on Small Arms has so far 
largely failed to produce any tangible results (Batchelor 2002, O’Dwyer 2006). 
The developments briefly sketched in this section indicate that the UN Security 
Council has become subject to politicization. International security is no longer the 
domaine réservée of states, and the Council is no longer insulated from normatively 
motivated public demand for more legitimate procedures and different policies. The 
importance of the public became most dramatically clear through then US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell’s infamous presentation at the Security Council to justify the war 
against Iraq. Powell’s presentation was clearly not intended to address primarily and 
                                                 
8 Price (1998, 622) explicitly argues that the issue of landmines was “politicized” by civil society 
actors. 
9 Interestingly, the Ottawa process took place outside of the usual United Nations framework on 
disarmament, largely due to the perceived ineffectiveness of these forums (Price 1998, Cameron 2002, 
O’Dwyer 2006). 
10 Regarding the politicization of the Security Council, it is important to note that, as with the 
ICBL, NGO work did not target the SC, but rather tried to bypass it. This is exemplified by the inclu-
sion of an independent prosecutor in the treaty, a fact that is often cited as one of the most important 
NGO successes in Rome (Glasius 2002). This provision actually diminishes the role of the SC com-
pared to previous drafts for an ICC statute. 
11 See <http://www.iansa.org/about.htm>, accessed 4 November 2008. 
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exclusively members of the Security Council, but rather an attempt to seek global 
public support. 
This process of politicization notwithstanding, the power of the Security Council, 
its exclusive and opaque decision making, and its politics of selectivity have not led to 
strong contestation. This is puzzling for the thesis of politicization and merits further 
research. Among the questions to be addressed are: What determines the level of 
contestation, and which conditions account for the variation in politicization? If it is 
true that power relations can lead to resistance, we would want to know which ones do 
this and which ones do not. According to Maiguashca (2003: 18), “we need to explore 
more systematically … when and under what conditions we chose to fight against 
particular power relations. After all, we do not mount resistance against any and all 
forms of governance …” Nevertheless, the Security Council has been politicized and, 
as the next section will show, the SC has cautiously opened up for NGO participation. 
3. The UN Security Council reluctantly opens up for NGOs 
The research on NGO access to international organizations finds that, globally, inter-
action between international organizations and civil society actors is growing, but 
varies considerably among international institutions and policy areas (Brühl 2003: 46, 
Charnovitz 2006: 368 ff., Steffek et al. 2008). So far, relatively little systematic 
attention has been devoted to international security institutions. However, in a recent 
study Mayer (2008) examines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for NGO participation; 
he finds that the field of international security is not immune to NGO access. While 
NATO grants almost no access to NGOs, the OSCE, to the contrary, cooperates 
closely with non-state actors in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and 
post-conflict peacebuilding. In this section, I will focus on the opening up for civil 
society actors by the United Nations Security Council, which has so far been largely 
neglected by the literature on NGO access to IOs. 
Unlike UN institutions such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
wherein, according to article 71 of the UN Charter, NGOs enjoy official status and 
formal consultative rights, there is no legal basis for cooperation between the SC and 
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civil society actors (Stoecker 2000: 175).12 Nevertheless, cautious SC-NGO interac-
tions in the form of informal consultations have developed over the past fifteen years. 
Apparently, SC members did not remain completely unaffected by legitimacy consid-
erations. According to Paul (2004: 375), 
“[c]ritics of the Council, including many influential government delegations, argued that 
the Council’s work lacked legitimacy because its practices included so little transparency 
or public accountability … As criticism of the Council grew, a number of delegations 
came to see increased Council interaction with NGOs as an essential step toward a more 
legitimate and effective international political and legal order”  
These SC-NGO interactions, limited entirely to informal consultation, are of three 
types: (1) Regular Meeting Process, (2) the “Arria Formula” and “Samovía Formula” 
meetings and (3) bilateral consultations. In addition to these types of meetings, there 
are also more indirect forms of interactions with NGOs including (4) lobbying, (5) 
international campaigning, and (6) the takeover of implementation tasks (see Brühl 
2003: 75-82). 
Informal interaction through consultation 
The Regular Meeting Process consists of informal briefings of individual members of 
the Security Council through several NGOs outside the Council chambers. Initially, 
the Permanent Members opposed the participation of NGOs in these informal consul-
tations. This changed, however; and, since 1997 NGOs, mainly from the Working 
Group on the Security Council, have met with all of Council ambassadors on a regular 
basis to exchange information. As a rule, about twenty NGO representatives partici-
pate in these meetings. The annual number of meetings grew from 15 in 1997 to 40 by 
2002.13 
 Arria Formula und Samovía Meetings: In 1993, Diego Arria, then UN Ambassa-
dor from Venezuela, met with a priest from Croatia. Since it was impossible to witness 
the testimony of this priest in an official UNSC session, Arria invited other members 
of the Security Council to meet outside the Council chambers. NGO representatives 
                                                 
12 For UN-NGOs relations, see Gordenker and Weiss 1996, Stoecker 2000, Alger 2002. 
13 See <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/wgmtgs.htm>, accessed 4 November 
2008; Weiss and Young (2005: 135). 
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were also eager to meet with the Council as a whole rather than speaking to Council 
members individually. Initial attempts to expand what became known as “Arria 
Formula” meetings to include NGOs were opposed by the Permanent Members. In 
February 1997, however, for the first time, Chile’s UN Ambassador, Juan Somavía, 
initiated consultations on a slightly modified basis between all of the SC members, 
representatives from three humanitarian NGOs—Oxfam, Médecins sans Frontières 
(MSF), and CARE—and the International Committee of the Red Cross, on the crisis in 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa.14 In an unprecedented move, the NGOs issued a 
joint statement heavily criticizing the SC for its failure to take action in the conflict. 
This response by the NGOs contributed to the opposition to the Somavía Initiative and 
put an end to any further meetings based on this formula. Likewise, but with one 
exception, the P-5 blocked further Arria-style briefings. In 2000, however, this 
changed and the Arria Formula meetings were revived. 
“Today, Arria Formula meetings take place virtually every month, sometimes more than 
once. Attendance is typically at a very high level—the permanent representative or dep-
uty. Only rarely do individual members fail to attend. The meetings are announced by the 
Council president at the beginning of each month or whenever organized, as part of the 
regular Council schedule. And the meetings are provided with full interpretation by the 
Secretariat. No Council meetings or consultations are ever scheduled at a time when the 
Arria Formula meetings take place. So the Arria system is an interesting mixture of in-
formality and formality. It allows the Council to sidestep its hide bound Rules of Proce-
dure and open itself in a very limited way to the outside world”.15 
From the perspective of the participating NGOs, these meetings obviously have high 
priority: “Th[e] work with the Security Council is considered highly valuable for the 
NGO and has become more important in recent years” (Martens 2004: 1060). Am-
nesty international, for instance, attaches a great deal of importance to its activity in 
the Security Council (Martens 2004: Fn 45). 
In addition to regular meetings and Arria Formula meetings, bilateral meetings 
between individual NGOs and individual representatives from SC member countries 
have begun to play an increasingly prominent role in interactions. This applies in 
particular to expert analyst NGOs like the International Peace Academy or the Interna-
                                                 
14 See <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/somavint.htm>, accessed 24 October 2008. 
15 See <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/arria.htm>, accessed 24 October 2008. 
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tional Crisis Group, whose representatives were invited to participate in the SC’s field 
mission to the African Great Lakes Region, in 2002 (Paul 2004: 381). Such informal 
consultations take place, generally, outside the Council chambers. In 2004, however, 
NGO representatives from CARE International and the Center for Transitional Justice 
gave a briefing on the role of civil society actors in post-conflict peacebuilding, for the 
first time, during a regular Council session (Charnovitz 2006: 368).16 
Regarding the initiation and evolution of SC-NGO interactions in general, it is 
worthy of note that NGO access—albeit limited—has been promoted primarily by the 
non-permanent members of the SC and smaller SC delegations who have had the most 
to gain by working with NGOs (Alger 2002: 102; Paul 2004: 379). Because of their 
limited resources, it is argued, smaller delegations simply cannot keep pace with the 
Security Council’s increased workload. As a result, they turn to NGOs in order to 
obtain information and expertise. Highly professionalized NGOs however, could 
provide more than just knowledge or expertise: “NGO partnerships could also help 
counterbalance the power of the permanent members in the Council” (Paul 2004: 376). 
Other forms of interaction between NGOs and the Security Council 
From its inception, the Security Council has been the target of lobbying. For instance, 
the Quakers and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintain 
offices near the UN headquarters and, very early on, established relations with the 
Security Council in the field of conflict resolution (Stoecker 2000: 176-177; Paul 
2004: 376-377). Other organizations followed suit in the 1990s, including Amnesty 
International, Save the Children, Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, and Global Witness. 
According to Paul (2004: 383), “[a]s NGOs gained experience in Council advocacy, 
many concluded that the most effective strategy combined diplomacy in New York 
with world-wide public advocacy campaigns.” For specific issues or concerns, NGOs 
form similar coalitions with like-minded states or other concurring NGOs, on an ad 
hoc basis. 
International campaigns are a well-known strategy of NGOs to generate public 
attention and support for specific issues. Through “naming and shaming,” civil society 
                                                 
16 See <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/brieindx.htm>, accessed 24 October 2008. 
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actors can exert pressure on states and international institutions to adopt different 
policies (Price 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Liese 2006). The NGO 
campaign against “blood diamonds” is an example of how NGOs successfully gained 
leverage on Security Council policymaking. In its influential report, “A rough trade,” 
Global Witness stressed the key role of diamonds in the Angolan conflict and docu-
mented the relationship between UNITA, de Beers, and other Western diamond 
producing companies. Shortly after the publication of that report, Global Witness 
representatives were invited to consultations with the Security Council’s Angola 
sanctions committee, leading ultimately to tougher and more sophisticated sanctions 
(Paul 2004: 381). 
Finally, NGOs may influence Security Council decisions by acting as implement-
ing agencies (Brühl 2003: 79). Security Council policy implementation via NGOs is of 
particular importance in the field of humanitarian assistance. As the Council expanded 
its activities in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, its interaction with 
humanitarian NGOs has also become intensified. These NGOs are not only present on 
the ground and provide resources, they also offer technical expertise and information. 
Beyond the provision of humanitarian assistance, NGOs were also called upon to 
assist the Security Council in “collective enforcement efforts” (Charnovitz 2006: 355). 
In two such instances, related by Charnovitz (2006: 355) the Council explicitly asked 
NGOs to provide information and resources: 
“[I]n a 1992 resolution regarding the former Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council called 
on states ‘and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate sub-
stantiated information’ relating to violations of humanitarian law. In a 2003 resolution re-
garding Sierra Leone, the Security Council called on ‘States, international organizations 
and non-governmental organizations to continue to support the National Recovery Strat-
egy of the Government of Sierra Leone.’” 
Altogether, according to some observers, these forms of NGO interaction had an 
impact on a number of Security Council decisions. For instance, it is argued that the 
transparency of the Council has grown compared to what it was during the Cold War 
era: “After more than a decade of NGO action the public knows much more about the 
Council than before, and citizens are in a stronger position to demand accountability 
for Council action” (Paul 2004: 385). Moreover, non-state actors that were previously 
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excluded from any admittance to the Security Council, today, have access to that body. 
Although substantial institutional reform did not occur (and is unlikely to do so in the 
future), there is now a regular, though informal, process of consultation between SC 
members and NGOs which has gradually become routine. Third, according to Paul 
(2004: 385) these interactions had a direct impact on some issues in “soft” policy 
areas. From this perspective, NGO influence is reflected in the Security Council’s 
broader thematic resolutions including those related to illicit arms flow or the protec-
tion of civilians in armed conflict. Likewise, Hill (2002) seeks to show how NGOs in 
an Arria Formula meeting contributed to the adoption of SC Resolution 1325 on 
women, peace, and security. According to these authors, NGOs also contributed to the 
establishment of the ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and to the 
strengthening of the Angolan sanctions regime. Although more detailed case studies 
will be required in order to trace the influence of NGOs in the Security Council 
decision-making process, the impact of SC-NGO interaction on a number of issues is 
fairly apparent. 
The opening of the UN Security Council to non-state actors notwithstanding, the 
extent to which access is granted remains informal and tightly limited. This becomes 
all the more apparent if the opening up of Security Council is compared to that of 
other international organizations like the ILO or ECOSOC, both of which grant 
substantial participatory rights to non-state actors. Regarding the Security Council, 
whether and to what extent NGOs may be involved is largely determined by the 
Permanent Members’ interests. Since Arria Formula meetings cannot take place 
without the prior consent of the Permanent Members (Hill 2002: 28), the P-5 retain 
control of whether consultations occur at all and which issues are to be addressed in 
NGO consultation. Thus, depending on the respective preferences, SC consultations 
with NGOs can also be arranged and used selectively. If any Permanent Member 
opposes civil society involvement, it does not hesitate to use its power to exclude 
NGOs. According to Paul (2004: 385), 
“many briefings proposed by NGOs were blocked because of the subject matter (Kashmir 
and Sudan being two notable cases). … When the P-5 have strong positions as they often 
do, NGOs encounter immovable opposition. On sanctions reform, Chechnya, the Middle 
East, Iraq, and many other important issues, even the most vigorous NGO advocacy runs 
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into the brick wall of P-5 opposition (especially from the United States), as national inter-
ests block key NGO concerns.” 
Apart from the fact that the opening up of the Security Council for NGOs is confined 
to informal consultations and largely depends on the will of its Permanent Members, 
substantial institutional reform of the Council is also blocked. Fassbender (2004: 341) 
observes, in this regard, “a certain ennui or resignation of the interested governments 
and nongovernmental organizations.” 
In sum, contrary to our initial theoretical expectations, the Security Council only 
met a modest level of politicization. At the same time, it did open up to some interac-
tion with, and input from, NGOs. These observations, however, require further clarifi-
cation. First, although the extent of contestation remained low, there are indications 
that the increased scope and authority of the Security Council produced normative 
demands for transparency, accountability, and participation. What is puzzling, how-
ever, is why, when compared to institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, or the 
G-8, contestation of the Security Council has remained relatively modest. Again, 
additional research will be needed in order to determine whether and how the in-
creased authority and power of multilateral organizations accounts for politicization 
(see Ecker-Erhardt and Wessels 2008). Second, while the Security Council has granted 
access to NGOs, civil society participation is confined to informal consultations, 
mostly in “soft” policy areas. However, compared to institutions such as NATO, 
which almost completely excludes NGOs, this opening up is remarkable. 
4. Why do international institutions open up for non-state actors? 
While it is widely agreed that international organizations increasingly grant access to 
transnational actors, two questions are puzzling. First, why do institutions agree to 
open up for non-state actors? And second, how can variation in the transnational 
access across institutions be explained? So far, a number of explanations have been 
offered (Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Raustiala 1997; Brühl 2003; Nölke 2000; Liese 
2008, Tallberg 2008; Steffek 2008) that very broadly refer to (1) resources, (2) power 
considerations and (3) norms. 
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From a rationalist-functionalist perspective it is argued that international organiza-
tions open up for transnational actors if these institutions benefit from NGO resources 
in terms of expertise, personnel, or funding, and if the benefits outweigh the increased 
transaction costs resulting from the interaction with NGOs. If the complexity of 
problems is high and the resources of international institutions are limited, then NGO 
assistance in providing additional knowledge and expertise, implementing interna-
tional organization (IO) policies, and monitoring compliance with international 
agreements are expected to be particularly beneficial to international institutions (Zürn 
et al. 2007: 138). Non-state actors that provide these services, it is argued, might 
receive access in exchange—they “trade” resources for participation (Raustiala 1997, 
Nölke 2000, Brühl 2003). Thus, from a resource exchange perspective, the hypothesis 
would lead us to expect that the opportunities for an NGO to access an IO increase 
with the complexity of the issue and the IO’s demand for resources controlled by the 
NGO (Mayer 2008: 134). 
When it comes to explaining transnational access to international security institu-
tions, Mayer (2008) argues that the differences between OSCE and NATO in opening 
up for NGOs result in part from their respective fields of activity. Compared to 
NATO, OSCE is more concerned with conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-
conflict peacebuilding. It is exactly in these areas of security governance, where NGOs 
do control resources that can be traded for participation. The same holds for the UN 
Security Council which has also stretched its scope of activity beyond “traditional” 
security threats to include more complex behind-the-boarder issues of human security. 
This shift would explain why the Security Council granted (limited) access to those 
NGOs that provide resources in these areas (in the form of expertise, human rights 
verification, humanitarian assistance etc. …).17 Likewise, resources might explain why 
the smaller, non-permanent members with limited resources are usually much more 
favorable to NGO participation than the Permanent Members who have much less to 
gain from interaction with NGOs. 
According to other scholars, access by civil society actors might be explained in 
terms of power considerations. The inclusion of NGOs is not neutral: it is expected to 
                                                 
17 Behind-the-boarder issues in particular lead to a demand for monitoring and verification (Zürn 
et al. 2007: 146). 
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change power relations between the members of an international organization (Tall-
berg 2008). Some states might benefit more than others from interaction with NGOs. 
Thus, transnational access is expected to vary depending on relative power concerns of 
member states. We expect “support for likeminded actors, opposition to antagonistic 
actors, and reinforcement of existing power structures” (Tallberg 2008: 25). Similarly, 
power relations might also matter between an international organization and trans-
national actors willing to participate. Steffek (2007: 123) argues that extensive asym-
metries between international organizations and NGOs in terms of resources or 
expertise negatively affect the opportunities for NGOs to participate. 
Regarding Security Council interaction with non-state actors, there is strong evi-
dence for power considerations being at work. First, the smaller delegations that have 
particularly promoted consultations with transnational actors seek not only to benefit 
from NGO resources, but also to “counterbalance the power of the permanent mem-
bers in the Council” (Paul 2004: 376). Second, concern for preserving existing power 
structures is reflected in the Permanent Members’ policy not only to prevent substan-
tial reform, but also to control SC-NGO interaction at will. On many occasions the P-5 
used their power to block Security Council consultations with NGOs. In the end, the 
Permanent Members managed to confine NGO interaction to a semi-formal consulta-
tion process of ad hoc meetings. This results in civil society participation “à la carte,” 
whereby the members of the SC gain legitimacy at the cost of only very small losses in 
autonomy. 
Finally, it is argued that the increased interactions between international institu-
tions and civil society actors have been promoted by a shift in international norms, 
principles and routines.18 From the perspective of sociological institutionalism, 
international organizations open up for civil society participation because the norms of 
democracy, transparency, and participation spread globally, and therefore international 
organizations adapted their respective institutional designs according to these norms 
(Di Maggio and Powell 1983: 151, Scott 1995). More specifically, Reimann (2006) 
identifies a “pro-NGO norm” and Charnovitz (2006) wonders if there is an emerging 
“duty to consult NGOs?” as the principle by which international organizations to grant 
access to civil society actors. Accordingly, NGOs have appealed to these norms 
                                                 
18 Organizational culture as a further explanation is not taken into account here. See Liese (2008). 
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whenever they demand access to IOs (O’Brien et al. 2000). This normative shift could 
have considerable explanatory power for transnational access, “because it may explain 
why organizations such as the IMF and the World Trade Organization have somewhat 
opened up to civil society although there are very little clear-cut [material] incentives 
for collaboration on the IGO side” (Steffek 2008: 23). However, while we might see 
institutional isomorphism in the sense that, globally, international organizations 
increasingly open up to civil society participation, there is considerable unexplained 
variance across international institutions vis-à-vis the extent to which access is granted 
to NGOs. 
This variance could perhaps be explained by politicization. According to this the-
sis, although normatively motivated demands for transparency, accountability, and 
participation clearly matter, they are not expected to automatically and uniformly 
translate into access for civil society actors. Rather, it is contended that the opportuni-
ties for NGO participation may depend on the (varying) strength of politicization. 
Indeed we can observe that the extent of politicization does vary and that some institu-
tions are clearly more contested than others. For purposes of future research, we might 
therefore consider politicization as an additional independent variable and test for 
whether there is a pattern that links (the degree of) opening up of international organi-
zation to the level of contestation. Such a relation, for instance, seems plausible for the 
World Bank and (to a lesser extent) the IMF which supposedly opened up due to mass 
protests (Woods and Narlikar 2001; Karns and Mingst 2004: 236).  
A similar case can be made for the UN Security Council. It has been shown that 
legitimacy is an important resource of the Council (Hurd 2007). Moreover, it appears 
that the Members of the Council care about its legitimacy and thus have responded to 
the norms of “good international governance” by opening up the Security Council for 
consultations with NGOs (Paul 2004: 375). At the same time, SC-NGO interactions 
remain limited. This, in turn, may result from the relatively modest level of public 
contestation of the Security Council. Thus while norms can account for the fact the 
Council has opened up, the low level of politicization explains why the access for 
NGOs remains largely confined to informal consultations and “soft” policy areas. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper I have tried to illustrate the plausibility of three alleged trends: the shift in 
the scope and authority of the Security Council, its politicization through civil society 
actors, and, finally, the reluctant opening up of the Council for transnational actors. 
Somewhat contrary to our initial theoretical expectations, the Security Council is not 
strongly contested, though politicization can be observed at a more modest level. 
Likewise, against all expectations, the Security Council did open up for NGO interac-
tion, although these interactions remain largely confined to informal consultations and 
to soft policy areas. 
To be sure, all of these trends must be substantiated by supplemental empirical 
evidence. Second, while there are a number of indications that these trends are linked 
one another, more research is needed to determine whether and how, exactly, these 
processes are related. In particular, we need to focus on the factors that influence the 
extent of politicization. Why is it that, despite its expansion in both scope and author-
ity, the Security Council has not been as contested as other international institutions, 
including the World Bank, the IMF or the G-8? Third, the reasons why (varying) 
access is granted to NGOs require further analysis. Regarding possible explanations 
for NGO access, the politicization of international organizations has thus far been 
widely neglected as a promising independent variable. Likewise, the brief overview 
provided in this paper indicates that different explanations put forward in the academic 
literature seem to contribute to the explanation. Rather than testing different explana-
tions against each other, this would suggest combining conditions from different 
theoretical perspectives in order to develop an explanatory model of transnational 
access to international organizations. 
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